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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR: WHY COMPULSORY LICENSING OF 
PROTECTED TECHNOLOGIES CRITICAL FOR  
FOOD SECURITY MIGHT JUST WORK IN CHINA 
Gregory C. Ellis† 
Abstract: The majority of people in the developed world have the luxury of never 
having to address food shortages and malnutrition.  In developing countries, however, 
ensuring food security presents greater challenges.  Agricultural biotechnology has the 
potential to alleviate many of the food crises occurring in developing countries.  Unlike 
private sector corporations, public sector entities are creating genetically modified 
(“GM”) crops to ensure food security.  However, the intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) 
to the many technologies required to create a single GM crop are often fragmented across 
the private and public sectors.  Fragmentation of IPRs creates a “patent thicket” that 
increases the challenges of developing GM crops that are not restrained by freedom to 
operate complications.  
China has a successful agricultural biotechnology industry that is almost entirely 
public sector.  Recently, China strengthened its intellectual property (“IP”) laws as a 
result of its accession to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).  Despite the beneficial 
effects of harmonizing IP laws among WTO member states, there exists a negative 
consequence of IP globalization as it pertains to China’s public sector-driven agricultural 
biotechnology industry.  Stronger IP laws and enforcement will create an environment 
more favorable to the interests of foreign private sector entities.  Any subsequent 
introduction of technologies used to create GM crops will result in the protection of such 
technologies under Chinese law, but without open availability under most circumstances.  
To reduce the potential frustration of its public sector, China should declare potential 
food shortages a national emergency.  In doing so, China may require compulsory 
licensing of the technologies necessary to create GM crops essential for food security 
without violating its WTO obligations.  Because the compulsory licenses would be 
granted only for selected technologies used to create GM crops, such licensing would 
reduce the negative effects of IPRs fragmentation without raising substantial concerns of 
compromised innovation resulting from parallel importation.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The developing world has over 800 million undernourished people.1  
Nearly eleven million children die each year, with more than half of these 
deaths resulting from hunger and malnutrition.2  The vast majority of deaths 
attributable to hunger and malnutrition occur in developing countries.3  
                                           
†
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of Law for his extremely helpful discussions on the topic, the editorial staff at the Pacific Rim Law & 
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Unfortunately, although there is currently enough food to feed the world, it 
is unequally distributed, as 650 million of the poorest people live where 
agricultural potential is substandard.4  Additional methods of ensuring food 
security to prevent hunger and malnutrition beyond the access to food 
paradigm must, therefore, be considered.5  Food security “exists when all 
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life.”6 
Agricultural biotechnology is one promising device heralded to be 
valuable in ensuring food security.7  Agricultural biotechnology research 
intended to enhance food security in developing countries includes creating 
GM crops that reduce the use of pesticides, improve stress tolerance, and 
provide better product quality and increased nutritional value.8   
The use of agricultural biotechnology to create GM crops is a 
contentious issue.  Opponents of this technology claim that GM crops are 
“inherently dangerous,”9 and that the scientific understanding of the impact 
that GM crops have on the environment and human health is inadequate.10  
Some of these concerns are legitimate.  For example, in September 2000, 
trace amounts of a transgenically expressed protein known as Cry9C, which 
is approved for animal but not human use, was found in Kraft Taco shells in 
the United States.11  These concerns are especially important in developing 
countries that are beginning to approve and commercialize GM crops but do 
not yet have comprehensive regulatory provisions in place.12  
                                           
4
 Gordon Conway & Gary Toenniessen, Feeding the World in the Twenty-First Century, 402 
NATURE C55, C55 (1999). 
5
 Id. 
6
 Robert H. Trudell, Food Security Emergencies and the Power of Eminent Domain: A Domestic 
Legal Tool To Treat A Global Problem, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 277, 277-78 (2005). 
7
 Barun Mitra et al., 31 Critical Questions In Agricultural Biotechnology, AGBIOWORLD, 
http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/agbio-articles/critical.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2006). 
8
 Joel I. Cohen, Poorer Nations Turn to Publicly Developed GM Crops, 23 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 27, 31-32 (2005). 
9
 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 57 
(2001). 
10
 See Greenpeace International, Say No to Genetic Engineering, http://www. greenpeace.org/ 
international/ campaigns/genetic-engineering/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
11
 Linda Beebe, Note, In re Starlink Corn: The Link Between Genetically Damaged Crops and an 
Inadequate Regulatory Frame Work for Biotechnology, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 511, 
514-17 (2004). 
12
 See generally Christina L. Richmond, Genetically Modified Crops in the Philippines: Can 
Existing Biosafety Regulations Adequately Protect the Environment?, 15 PAC.RIM L. & POL’Y J. 569 (2006) 
(discussing how the Philippines’ existing regulations are inadequate to address the environmental impacts 
of agricultural biotechnology). 
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Despite such criticisms, proponents of agricultural biotechnology 
argue that its benefits far outweigh its potential risks, and that the risks that 
do exist are not inherent properties of the technology.  According to the 
Declaration of Support for Agricultural Biotechnology, signed by over 3400 
international scientists, including twenty-five Nobel Prize Laureates,13 the 
technologies utilized to create GM crops can safely and substantially 
enhance efforts to ensure food security.14  Dr. Patrick Moore, a co-founder 
and former leader of Greenpeace who has since signed the Declaration, 
stated that “the campaign of fear now being waged against genetic 
modification is based largely on fantasy and a complete lack of respect for 
science and logic.”15   
Critics further assert that agricultural biotechnology corporations 
exploit the hungry in developing countries for “commercial opportunity,” 
some going as far as labeling this activity as criminal.16  This claim, 
however, fails to acknowledge that while the private sector focuses mostly 
on crops with large markets, the nonprofit public sector provides the 
developing world with subsistence crops to ensure food security, despite 
their lack of high commercial value.17 
China provides a model for public sector success with respect to 
agricultural biotechnology, with almost all research and development in this 
field being conducted by the public sector.18  What makes China unique in 
comparision to other developing countries’ public sectors is its strong 
scientific infrastructure.19  This infrastructure allows Chinese scientists 
involved in agricultural research to successfully generate “an impressive 
array of new technologies.”20  Furthermore, China’s agricultural 
biotechnology industry focuses on providing food security, as “the foods 
                                           
13
 Scientists In Support of Agricultural Biotechnology, AGBIOWORLD, http://www.agbioworld.org/ 
declaration/index.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2006). 
14
 Petition In Support of Agricultural Biotechnology, AGBIOWORLD, http://www.agbioworld.org/ 
declaration/petition/petition.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2006). 
15
 C.S. Prakash, Greenpeace Founder Supports Biotechnology, AGBIOWORLD, Mar. 6, 2001, 
http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/pr/moore.html. 
16
 Reece Walters, Crime, Bio-Agriculture and the Exploitation of Hunger, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
26, 26 (2006). 
17
 Richard C. Atkinson et al., Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management, 301 
SCIENCE 174, 174 (2003); Eran Binenbaum et al., South-North Trade, Intellectual Property Jurisdiction, 
and Freedom to Operate in Agricultural Research on Staple Crops, 51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 
309, 309-10 (2003). 
18
 Fred Gale et al., Is Biotechnology in China’s Future?, in CHINA’S FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: 
ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 34, 34 (2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ 
aib775/aib775m.pdf; Jikun Huang et al., Plant Biotechnology in China, 295 SCIENCE 674, 674 (2002). 
19
 Huang et al., supra note 18, at 674. 
20
 Id. 
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being modified [in China] reflect the concern that current food production 
will not fill the hungry mouths of its future population.”21 
Agricultural biotechnology research poses unique IP issues that are 
particularly pronounced for the public sector.22  These IP issues lie not with 
the GM crops themselves, but with the technologies required to create 
them.23  Developing a single GM crop requires numerous technologies.24  
Innovators usually protect these technologies via IPRs, most notably 
patents,25 which are often held by dissimilar owners.26  IPRs fragmentation 
develops when no single IPRs owner has complete ownership of all the 
technologies required to create a GM crop.27  In such a situation, all that is 
required to hinder the development of an important GM crop is for a single 
IPRs holder to refuse to license the technology.28  However, as agricultural 
biotechnology research and development in China is driven by the public 
sector, fragmentation of IPRs among the public and private sectors has been 
largely nonexistent.  
On December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd member of the 
WTO.29  As a result, China has been strengthening its intellectual property 
laws as mandated by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement,30 applicable to all WTO members.31  The main 
objectives of TRIPS are to improve and harmonize IP protection and to 
                                           
21
 Tom Clarke, China Leads GM Revolution, NATURE, Jan. 25, 2002, http://www.nature.com/news/ 
2002/020121/full/020121-13.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007). 
22
 Conway and Toenniessen, supra note 4, at C57-C58.  See generally Atkinson et al., supra note 17 
(discusses the IP complications that exist when a single GM crop requires numerous patented technologies 
that are owned by multiple entities); Gregory D. Graff et al., The Public-Private Structure of Intellectual 
Property Ownership in Agricultural Biotechnology, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 989 (2003) (discusses 
the difficulties public sector agricultural biotechnology entities face when private sector entities hold IPRs 
to technologies required by the public sector).   
23
 Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174; Graff et al., supra note 22, at 992-994. 
24
 Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174. 
25
 Although this comment deals with IP issues relating mostly to patents, this comment will broadly 
refer to any type of IP protection as IPRs, so as to not inadvertently exclude other types of IP protection 
other than patents that might be relevant to issues discussed in this comment. 
26
 Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174. 
27
 Id.; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
28
 Graff et al., supra note 22, at 989. 
29
 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE, 9 
(2004); see also World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (providing the terms of China’s accession agreement). 
30
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; Id. at 5. 
31
 Id. at art. 1; World Trade Organization, Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#Who'sSigned (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
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introduce compulsion through enforceable sanctions.32  Although the 
advantages of IPRs harmonization might outweigh the disadvantages, this 
comment will address a unique and potentially negative effect resulting from 
the strengthening of IPRs in China.   
The strengthening of IPRs in China will help to create an environment 
more favorable to the interests of the private sector’s agricultural 
biotechnology interests.  Consequently, the private sector’s presence will 
likely increase in China.  This will lead to the fragmentation of IPRs 
between China’s public sector and the private sector entities interested in 
protecting their technologies for commercial purposes.  Such a divide will 
frustrate China’s efforts to ensure adequate food security.   
This comment argues that, to prevent IPRs fragmentation, China 
should exercise its right under TRIPS to mandate compulsory licensing for 
protected technologies essential for food security.  As compulsory licensing 
for pharmaceuticals is controversial due to concerns of parallel importing, 
those licenses should only be granted under exceptional circumstances.  
However, similar parallel importing concerns would be less substantial for 
agricultural biotechnologies in China because the same technologies may be 
used for other GM crops with significantly higher commercial value.  As a 
result, compulsory licenses are more appropriate for agricultural 
biotechnologies important to the public sector than for pharmaceutical 
products.  Part II of this comment describes the issues surrounding the public 
sector’s efforts to develop GM crops for purposes of food security, as well as 
the current agricultural biotechnology environment in China.  Part III 
discusses the recent strengthening of Chinese IP laws and enforcement.  Part 
IV predicts the likelihood and subsequent consequences of an increased 
presence of foreign agricultural biotechnology companies in China.  Finally, 
Part V argues that compulsory licensing of technologies essential for food 
security can proceed without violating TRIPS or compromising overall 
innovation within the agricultural biotechnology industry.  
II. FRAGMENTED IPRS CREATE CHALLENGES FOR AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY’S PUBLIC SECTOR 
In developing countries such as China, the public sector focuses its 
research on basic food staples important to local economies.33  When the 
                                           
32
 JOHN REVESZ, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION STAFF RESEARCH PAPER, at xvi (1999), available at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/staffres/trips/trips.pdf. 
33
 Cohen, supra note 8, at 31. 
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creation of a single GM crop requires multiple technologies, freedom to 
operate complications will result if the IPRs holders of such technologies 
prevent access to their technologies. 
A. The Public Sector in Developing Countries Anticipates Using 
Agricultural Biotechnology to Ensure Food Security 
Beginning in the 1960s, agricultural research aimed at increasing the 
overall food production in order to meet the demands of a rapidly growing 
population resulted in higher yielding varieties of rice, wheat, and maize.34  
Known as the Green Revolution, this campaign to increase food security 
helped reduce the total number of hungry persons by more than half.35  
Today however, over 800 million people are still undernourished,36 and “the 
gains in food production provided by the Green Revolution have reached 
their ceiling while the world population continues to rise.”37  By the year 
2048, the world population will grow from six to nine billion.38 Furthermore, 
global warming, deforestation, pollution, overgrazing, soil erosion, and 
urbanization will challenge the assurance of adequate food security.39  
Although the guarantee of food security will ultimately require 
multiple approaches, agricultural biotechnology provides a promising tool to 
combat hunger and malnutrition.40  The proportion of the global area of GM 
crops grown in developing countries increased every year during the period 
from 1996 to 2005.41  Furthermore, the governments of developing countries 
in Asia appear to vigorously support agricultural biotechnology.42  
                                           
34
 Conway & Toenniessen, supra note 4, at C55. 
35
 Id. 
36
 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, supra note 1, at 30. 
37
 Conway & Toenniessen, supra note 4, at C55. 
38
 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GLOBAL POPULATION AT A GLANCE: 2002 AND BEYOND (2004), available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/wp02-1.pdf. 
39
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND FOOD 
SECURITY 4 (2001) (listing pollution, deforestation, and urbanization); Nsongurua J. Udombana, How 
Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership For Africa’s Development, 20 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 293, 317 (2002) (highlighting global warming); Indra K. Vasil, Biotechnology and Food Security for 
the 21st Century: A Real-World Perspective, 16 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 399, 399 (1998) (citing 
pollution, overgrazing, and soil erosion); Lauren Sacks & Cynthia Rosenzweig, Climate Change and Food 
Security, CLIMATE.ORG, http://www.climate.org/topics/agricul/index.shtml#warming (last visited Jan. 28, 
2007) (citing global warming).  
40
 Conway & Toenniessen, supra note 4, at C55; Mitra et al., supra note 7. 
41
 CLIVE JAMES, INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, 
GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2005, at 6 (2005). 
42
 Richmond, supra note 12, at 571; see also RAYMOND HOH, USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL 
SERVICE GAIN REPORT, MALAYSIA BIOTECHNOLOGY ANNUAL 2006, at 6-7 (2006); NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY, THAILAND’S NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY FRAMEWORK 2004-2009, at 1 (2005); Clarke, 
supra note 21. 
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Therefore, this comment will assume that agricultural biotechnology will 
continue to be a potential avenue for food security in developing Asian 
countries.  The primary focus of this comment is not to discuss the benefits 
and risks of agricultural biotechnology, as exhaustive debates on this subject 
may be found elsewhere.  Instead, this comment will focus on the IP-related 
issues complicating the efforts of China’s public sector to create GM crops 
aimed at reducing hunger and malnutrition. 
B. China’s Thriving Agricultural Biotechnology Industry is Public Sector 
and Focuses on Food Security 
China conducts more research on plant biotechnologies than any other 
country outside of North America43 and accounts for over ten percent of all 
public sector expenditures on agricultural biotechnology research 
worldwide.44  By acreage, China is the fifth largest producer of agricultural 
biotechnology crops in the world.45  Furthermore, China’s public sector is 
committed to developing GM crops that the developed world has largely 
ignored.46  This contrasts sharply with the objectives of private sector 
entities that fail to focus on “crops that are important to the world’s poor 
farmer.”47  Although China has limited commercial ambitions with respect to 
its agricultural biotechnology industry, the industry’s primary focus lacks the 
commercial ambitions of other Asian countries.  For example, Thailand has 
recently launched an aggressive agricultural biotechnology campaign in 
hopes that it will become known as “[t]he kitchen of the world.”48  This 
campaign exists as an effort to increase its export revenue.49   
The incentive to increase food security in China is profound, as 
approximately 142 million (eleven percent) of China’s population is 
undernourished.50  Although China has less than ten percent of the world’s 
arable land, it feeds more than twenty percent of the world’s population.51  
With the predicted population increases, China will need to increase its food 
grain production by almost forty-five percent by 2020 to maintain its current 
                                           
43
 Clarke, supra note 21. 
44
 Huang et al., supra note 18 at 675. 
45
 USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2005, at 3. 
46
 Huang et al., supra note 18 at 674. 
47
 Id. 
48
 NATIONAL CENTER FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 42, at 6-9 
(2005). 
49
 Id. 
50
 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at 30. 
51
 Huang et al., Agricultural Biotechnology Policy Processes in China 7 (2001), available at 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/KNOTS/PDFs/China.pdf. 
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food supply.52  To reach this goal, China has been increasing its publicly 
funded research investments in agricultural biotechnology.53  During the 
second half of the last decade, investment in agricultural biotechnology 
increased thirty percent per year,54 and in 2004, China spent $200 million on 
agricultural biotechnology research.55 
The success of China’s agricultural biotechnology research efforts 
comes not only from the financial expenditures put forth by public 
investment, but also to its strong scientific infrastructure.56  China employs 
over two thousand employees in agricultural biotechnology research alone.57  
As of 2001, China had close to 150 laboratories located in more than fifty 
research institutes and universities working on agricultural biotechnology.58  
The Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences, provincial academies of agricultural sciences, and general and 
agricultural universities carry out China’s agricultural research.59  
Furthermore, the percentage of agricultural biotechnology scientists having 
Ph.D.s is expected to increase as the ability to conduct Ph.D. educational 
programs in biotechnology continues to strengthen.60  These efforts have led 
to China’s Ministry of Agriculture’s approval of 585 GM plant experiments, 
including 154 environmental releases, as of 2003.61  China’s identification of 
over 120 functional genes used in agricultural biotechnology research and 
development exemplifies the fruits of its strong scientific infrastructure.62   
                                           
52
 Id. at 7-8. 
53
 Jikun Huang & Qinfang Wang, Agricultural Biotechnology Development and Policy in China, 5 
AGBIOFORUM 122, 131 (2002). 
54
 Id. 
55
 John D. Connor et al., China’s Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology, THE METROPOLITAN 
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Dec. 2006, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view& 
EntryNo=5987 (last visited Apr. 5, 2007). 
56
 Huang et al., supra note 18, at 675. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Huang & Wang, supra note 53, at 125. 
59
 Carl E. Pray, Public and Private Collaboration on Plant Biotechnology in China, 2 AGBIOFORUM 
48, 49 (1999). 
60
 Huang et al., Agricultural Biotechnology Research Indicators: China 8 (Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Working Paper, Oct. 2001), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/data/295/5555/674/DC1/4. 
61
 Jia Hepeng, China Intends to Push For GM Crop Studies, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 14, 2006, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-02/14/content_519960.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2007). 
62
 Huang et al., supra note 60, at 25. 
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C. Fragmentation of IPRs Creates Obstacles for Public Sector Entities 
Engaged in Agricultural Biotechnology Research  
The fragmentation of IPRs among multiple owners of the technologies 
used to create GM crops complicates public sector agricultural 
biotechnology research.63  The creation of a single GM crop requires 
incremental improvements upon previously derived processes.64  Many of 
the incremental improvements pertain to “enabling technologies,” processes 
that can be used to create a variety of different GM crops.65  A process that 
improves the transfer of an exogenously expressed gene into a host plant is 
an example of such an enabling technology.66  When commercial interests 
are at stake, however, proprietary owners of one or more of the enabling 
technologies required to develop a GM crop may be reluctant to provide 
access to the protected technologies.67   
Golden Rice, a GM crop, best exemplifies the complexity of the 
“patent thicket” created by IPRs fragmentation.  Golden Rice is genetically 
modified to contain significantly elevated levels of vitamin A as a result of 
the transgenic expression of beta-carotene, a vitamin A precursor.68  Chronic 
vitamin A deficiency affects between one and two hundred million children, 
resulting in permanent blindness for about 500,000 of these children each 
year.69  Additionally, between one and three million children die annually of 
infections, which would have been preventable had the children acquired 
sufficient amounts of vitamin A.70   
Golden Rice exemplifies the benefits of GM crops that can 
compensate for nutritional deficiencies.71  The potential impact of Golden 
Rice, which is predicted to save almost 40,000 lives annually in the 
developing world, is astounding.72  The development of Golden Rice, 
however, required seventy patent-protected technologies belonging to over 
                                           
63
 Atkinson et al., supra note17, at 174; Graff et al., supra note 22, at 989. 
64
 Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Graff et al., supra note 22, at 992. 
67
 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 698. 
68
 See generally Jacqueline A. Paine et al., Improving the Nutritional Value of Golden Rice Through 
Increased Pro-Vitamin A Content, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 482 (2005) (scientific publication that 
describes the preferential accumulation of beta-carotene in rice through the transgenic expression of the 
phytoene synthase gene from maize in combination with the Erwinia uredovora carotene desaturase gene). 
69
 Stanley P. Kowalski & R. David Kryder, Golden Rice: A Case Study in Intellectual Property 
Management and International Capacity Building, 13 RISK 47, 51-52 (2002). 
70
 Id. at 52. 
71
 Id. at 51-52. 
72
 Alexander J. Stein et al., Potential Impact and Cost-Effectiveness of Golden Rice, 24 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1200, 1201 at Table 1 (2006). 
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thirty public and private sector entities.73  Remarkably, every owner of the 
IPRs required to create Golden Rice provided free licenses so that the 
product would be available to small farmers in developing countries.74  It is 
difficult to determine whether the biotechnology companies that provided 
the free licenses did so as a show of humanitarianism or anticipated that such 
a gesture would garner larger acceptance of agricultural biotechnology.75  No 
matter their motivation, those interested in creating nonprofit GM crops for 
purposes of food security may not necessarily find themselves in the same 
fortuitous situation that led to the complete and free licenses of Golden Rice.  
An advantage of China’s public sector-driven agricultural 
biotechnology industry is a lack of fragmentation among private sector 
entities.  It is difficult to determine whether the absence of IPRs 
fragmentation has contributed, in parallel with a strong scientific 
infrastructure, to China’s success in the industry.  Regardless, private sector 
entities that refuse to license enabling technologies required for the 
development of GM crops currently do not hinder Chinese efforts of food 
security. 
III. CHINA’S MEMBERSHIP IN THE WTO ENCOURAGED THE STRENGTHENING 
OF IPRS IN CHINA 
TRIPS has applied to China since it became a member of the WTO in 
2001.76  The application of TRIPS has subsequently resulted in the 
strengthening and harmonization of Chinese IP laws and enforcement as 
mandated by the agreement.77   
A. TRIPS Requires WTO Member States to Have Strong IPRs 
The main objective of TRIPS is to harmonize intellectual property 
laws, which emerged from the realization that IPRs are territorially restricted 
to national boundaries and have little or no protection in foreign countries 
that do not have similar protections.78  With little to no protection in other 
countries, minimal incentive to invest or spread innovation into those 
                                           
73
 Ronald P. Cantrell et al., The Impact of Intellectual Property on Nonprofit Research Institutions 
and the Developing Countries They Serve, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 253, 269 (2004). 
74
 Remigius N. Nwabueze, What Can Genomics and Health Biotechnology Do For Developing 
Countries?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 369, 394 (2005); Cantrell, supra note 73, at 270. 
75
 Sara Boettiger & Alan Bennett, The Bayh-Dole Act: Implications For Developing Countries, 46 
IDEA 261, 270 (2006). 
76
 See TRIPS art. 1. 
77
 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 29, at 5. 
78
 Revesz, supra note 32, at 5. 
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countries exists.79  Although acceptance of TRIPS is mandatory for any 
country now interested in joining the WTO, during negotiations of the 
agreement in the 1990s, developing countries were politically encouraged to 
accept TRIPS as a WTO requirement.  This occurred mainly as a result of 
threats of unilateral sanctions, by the United States and the European Union, 
against those countries that were infringing upon their IPRs.80  Despite the 
ostensible lack of options presented to developing countries during the 
TRIPS negotiations, some benefits were provided.  For example, trade 
restrictions were liberalized for agricultural and textile imports from 
developed countries to the developing countries that accepted TRIPS.81   
Requiring developing countries to agree to TRIPS, and IP 
globalization in general, is an extremely complex and much debated topic.  
Opponents of IP globalization view it as an imposition of control by 
countries that own the majority of IPRs.82  However, supporters of IP 
globalization believe that a recipient country will benefit as a result of 
increased foreign investment and technology transfer,83 resulting in greater 
economic growth.84 
The TRIPS agreement provides enforcement mechanisms in addition 
to compliance mechanisms in order to harmonize the member states’ laws.85  
Two enforcement provisions exist under TRIPS.86  The first relates to 
domestic enforcement, and requires member states to provide effective and 
expeditious remedies to prevent infringements.87  The second provides for a 
dispute settlement mechanism between two member states through the WTO 
itself.88 
With respect to biotechnology, the TRIPS agreement contains 
important provisions necessary for the promulgation of advancements in 
agricultural biotechnology.  Agricultural biotechnology management further 
poses IP-related issues.  Innovations can be easily duplicated, as “seed[s] can 
be replanted, genes can be cloned based on sequence information, [and] 
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methods can be copied following established protocols.”89  This creates the 
demand for increased international IPRs protection for biotechnology 
innovations.90  One such provision of TRIPS is the requirement that all WTO 
member states protect GM microorganisms.91  This provision parallels 
United States patent law interpreted by the landmark United States Supreme 
Court case in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which held that bioengineered 
microorganisms are patentable.92  Diamond arguably provided a judicial 
basis upon which the biotechnology industry flourished.93  Furthermore, 
TRIPS stipulates that plant varieties must be protected “either by patents or 
by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.”94  Still to 
be resolved however, is whether TRIPS should require mandatory protection 
of biotechnology innovations above the level of the microorganism.95 
B. Chinese Patent Law Is Conducive To Biotechnological Innovation 
China actively engages in patenting both domestic and foreign 
innovations, including those essential for the progression of agricultural 
biotechnology.  In 2005, the State Intellectual Property Office of China 
(“SIPO”) granted 171,000 patents to Chinese citizens, and 42,000 to 
foreigners.96  Between 1985 and 1999, Chinese herbal medicines, foodstuffs, 
and pharmaceuticals had the largest number of patent applications.97  China 
amended its patent law as recently as 2001 and remains consistent with the 
requirements of TRIPS.98  One noticeable difference between U.S. and 
Chinese patent law is the way in which subject matter is determined.  
Although the United States does not specifically bar specific subject 
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matter,99 a list of specifically excluded subject matter exists in Chinese 
patent law.100 
With respect to claim language, products can be either a compound, a 
composition, or product defined by a process.101  Because genetic materials 
are chemical structures, DNA, RNA, and chromosomes are patentable as 
chemical substances under Chinese patent law.102  However, such genetic 
materials must be isolated or purified from their natural environment and 
cannot be mere discoveries.103  In addition, Chinese patent law does not 
allow for the patenting of plant varieties.  However, methods of breeding the 
plant varieties are allowed.104 
C.  Enforcement of IPRs in China is Improving 
Although China’s IP laws are consistent with the requirements of 
TRIPS, international concerns exist regarding the enforcement of these laws.  
With respect to IP protection and enforcement, China is of the highest 
priority for the United States. 105  The United States considers China to have 
the greatest occurrence of counterfeiting in the world.106  Ninety percent of 
all protected goods in China are counterfeits.107  To promote strong IP 
protection in China, the United States plans to continue to engage in bilateral 
discussions to encourage effective use of trade tools.108  Further efforts will 
include the expansion of law enforcement cooperation, education and 
capacity building, and private sector cooperation.109  Recently, the United 
States has been more assertive, using “high-level meetings to strongly urge 
China to take immediate and substantial steps to put it on the path toward 
compliance with its critical TRIPS Agreement obligation to make available 
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effective enforcement mechanisms.”110  The United States has also been 
considering WTO dispute settlement options.111 
Although a significant percentage of IP violations in China are 
copyright and trademark issues, biotechnology continues to be a problem, as 
ninety seven percent of small molecule pharmaceuticals in China are 
copies.112  Pharmaceutical (and presumably agricultural biotechnology) 
counterfeits are particularly worrisome with respect to safety concerns 
resulting from the lack of regulatory approval.113  Specific to IP violations of 
agricultural biotechnology innovations, the only foreign product to be 
commercialized in China thus far, Monsanto’s Bt cotton,114 has suffered 
economic setbacks resulting from counterfeiting.115 
The improvement of IP enforcement is a focus of Chinese intellectual 
property policy.  Currently, China’s IP laws and regulations provide for IP 
enforcement through administrative authorities, criminal prosecutions, and 
civil action.116  At the Joint Commission of Commerce and Trade meeting 
with the United States in 2004, China committed itself to increasing IP 
enforcement and agreed to move forward with legislative and judicial 
measures to improve its protection of IPRs.117  Furthermore, the National 
IPR[s] Protection Working Group Office formulated “China’s Action Plan on 
IPR[s] Protection 2006” to “better protect [] IPR[s], resolutely punish and 
combat various infringement and other illegal activities.”118  The plan 
focuses mainly on improving IP enforcement.119  With respect to patents, the 
plan aims to both standardize the conduct of patent agents and to revise and 
issue a guide on patent review.120 
China is further attempting to strengthen enforcement of its IPRs 
through litigation.  The number of Chinese patent litigation cases has been 
increasing, indicating that “awareness of the exploitation and enforcement of 
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intellectual property is building, and that the Chinese economy is becoming 
more technology-intensive.”121  Lawsuits in China related to IPRs are 
grouped into two types of categories:  patent administrative lawsuits that are 
similar to criminal cases between SIPO and a private party, and patent civil 
lawsuits.122  In 2005, Chinese courts tried 3529 patent administrative 
lawsuits involving IPRs violations, a twenty-eight percent increase from the 
previous year.123  Additionally, 13,393 civil cases were tried for IPRs 
violations in 2005, which was a thirty-eight percent increase from the 
previous year.124  The increases in IPRs-related litigation appear to be part of 
a larger trend, as Chinese courts adjudicated a total of 23,636 IP-related 
cases for the entire four year period between 1998 and 2002, a forty 
percentage increase from the previous four year period.125   
In spite of the efforts of the United States and China, sufficient 
enforcement of IPRs in China continues to be a challenging undertaking.  
This can be attributed to a complexity of factors, including the lack of 
government coordination, local corruption, high thresholds for criminal 
prosecution, and lack of resources and training.126  Nonetheless, China’s 
strengthening of its IP laws and enforcement are creating a setting more 
favorable to the interests of foreign agricultural biotechnology companies. 
IV. STRONGER IP ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA WILL LIKELY RESULT IN IPRS 
FRAGMENTATION AMONG PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES 
While the harmonization of IP laws among WTO member states has 
had beneficial effects, the strengthening of Chinese IP laws and enforcement 
is likely to have negative consequences on China’s agricultural 
biotechnology industry.  With the increase in private sector IPRs protection, 
the introduction of fragmentation of IPRs among the private and public 
sector will occur.  This will further increase the challenges China faces with 
respect to its efforts to ensure food security. 
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A. Foreign Agricultural Biotechnology Companies Have Historically 
Been Reluctant to Invest in China 
Weak IP protection may be a factor in the public sector domination of 
China’s agricultural biotechnology.  Strong IP protection in developing 
countries is theorized to encourage innovation while providing the economic 
confidence needed to attract foreign investment.127  Foreign direct 
investment, which is the result of the establishment of production 
subsidiaries by a foreign enterprise, can be a source of capital and 
technology transfer.128  Technology transfer is “the application of 
technologies in new geographic or product areas . . . ”129  Subsequently, this 
increase in foreign investment and technology transfer will ultimately 
“translate into faster rates of economic growth.”130 
Although maximum IP protection may not necessarily lead to the 
greatest amount of foreign investment,131 “various authors have found lack 
of enforcement to be a deterrent for foreign direct investment.”132  This is 
more true with agricultural biotechnology than with other industries in China 
that do not have weak foreign direct investment, as the cost of developing a 
GM crop may be over $150 million.133  Without strong IPRs, the industry 
would not be able to bear the substantial investment risk associated with 
agricultural biotechnology.134  As described previously, the only private 
sector GM crop from abroad to have been previously adopted to a 
substantial degree in China was a cotton variety made by Monsanto.135  
However, because of China’s weak IPRs at the time, Monsanto exposed 
itself to “significant local piracy” of its seeds, resulting in a loss of 
investment income.136 
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In addition to the reluctance of foreign companies to invest in 
agricultural biotechnology due to investment risk, foreign agricultural 
biotechnology companies may be reluctant to invest in China because of 
protectionist measures taken by the Chinese government.  One form of 
protectionism is based on restrictions on foreign agricultural biotechnology 
firms, which may be keeping many foreign agricultural biotech firms from 
entering the Chinese market.137  These restrictions may have occurred “to 
frustrate the commercial ambitions of Western [agricultural biotechnology] 
firms.”138  This apparent protectionism is possibly attributed to the desire of 
China’s public sector-dominated agricultural biotechnology industry to catch 
up to the advances made by foreign entities.139 
Protectionism in China’s biotechnology industries may eventually 
ease as China develops a stronger IP regime.  In agricultural biotechnology’s 
sister industry, pharmaceuticals, recent attempts at protectionism have been 
unsuccessful.  In 2004, the Chinese Patent Office invalidated Pfizer’s Viagra 
patent because of insufficient disclosure.140  This decision caused immediate 
polarization among the Chinese and United States governments and caused 
the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to issue a warning that this decision may deter 
foreign investment due to insufficient IPRs protection.141  However, others 
commented that the decision of the Chinese Patent Office was not indicative 
of protectionism, but actually an indication of stronger IP protection 
resulting from more stringent analyses of patent applications.142  In June 
2006, a Chinese court revoked the invalidation of the patent, essentially 
giving Pfizer patent protection for Viagra in China.143  Whether this 
particular case was indicative of China’s commitment to stronger IPRs or a 
weakening of protectionism due to political pressures is difficult to 
determine.  In either case, it may be viewed as yet another suggestion of 
confidence for the biotechnology private sector in expanding their 
commercial interests to China.  
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B. Increased Interest in Agricultural Biotechnology from Foreign 
Companies Would Bring with It Increased IPRs Fragmentation 
Two factors are likely to increase the presence of the private sector 
from abroad in China:  the strengthening of IPRs and the weakening of 
protectionism.  In 2004, Roche Pharmaceuticals announced the creation of a 
research and development center in China.144  A major factor in convincing 
Roche to establish the center in China was the recent strengthening of 
IPRs.145  It is difficult to conclusively determine whether private sector 
agricultural biotechnology companies from abroad will also begin to 
seriously invest in the Chinese market.  Nonetheless, an environment 
conducive to private sector interests has become more favorable in recent 
years. 
As a result of such a setting in which foreign private sector entities 
will no longer hesitate to invest, China will likely see an increase in foreign 
agricultural biotechnology companies wishing to expand the protection of 
their enabling technologies under Chinese law.  Such technologies will 
unquestionably include processes that can be used to create GM crops that 
the public sector believes necessary to ensure food security.  Consequently, 
emergence of the private sector will lead to issues of IPRs fragmentation 
among the private and public sectors as seen in other developing 
countries.146  Accordingly, China must protect the interests of its public 
sector from this highly probable occurrence. 
V. REQUIRING COMPULSORY LICENSING OF CRITICAL IPRS WILL 
FACILITATE CHINA’S OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING FOOD SECURITY 
China’s stronger IP laws and improvements in enforcement will likely 
result in IPRs fragmentation between foreign private sector agricultural 
biotechnology companies and China’s public sector.  However, the 
implementation of a compulsory licensing scheme could function to prevent 
encumbrances of advances made towards food security.  Because 
compulsory licenses would be granted for selected enabling technologies 
used to create GM crops, and not the product itself, such licensing would not 
raise substantial concerns of parallel importing.  As a result, concerns of 
compromised innovation would be minimal. 
                                           
144
 Jia, supra note 112, at 368. 
145
 Id. 
146
 See Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174. 
JUNE 2007 FOOD SECURITY IN CHINA 717 
  
A. TRIPS and Chinese Patent Law Permit Compulsory Licensing 
Compulsory licenses can be utilized to force an IPRs owner to share 
its protected technology.  A compulsory license is a type of nonexclusive 
license resulting from governmental action.147  It allows one party to produce 
a protected product or process without the consent of another party that 
owns the rights to the intellectual property.148  The policy behind compulsory 
licensing is to adjust “the balance between public interests and the private 
interests of patent holders by providing an exception to the exclusive rights 
normally provided by [an intellectual property right].”149 
While TRIPS doesn’t explicitly use the phrase “compulsory 
licensing,” the phrase “other use without authorization of the right holder” 
found in Article 31 implies that it permits WTO member states to include a 
compulsory licensing provision in their IP laws.150  However, compulsory 
licensing “can only be done under a number of conditions aimed at 
protecting the legitimate interests of the patent holder.”151  The constraints 
must meet at least one of five “broadly defined public purposes:  (1) to 
ameliorate a refusal to deal (essentially a failure to work the patent); (2) to 
address a health or other emergency of extreme urgency; (3) to resolve 
anticompetitive practices; (4) for noncommercial use; and (5) for dependent 
patents.”152 
Chinese patent law permits compulsory licensing under requisite 
conditions.153  However, a compulsory license has never been granted 
against a non-Chinese corporation’s protected property.154  Apart from this 
fact, China is not prohibited from licensing a foreign corporation’s 
technology that is protected under Chinese patent law, as long as Article 31 
of TRIPS is not violated. 
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B. Compulsory Licensing Is Controversial Due to Concerns that Such 
Licenses May Deter Innovation  
Proponents of compulsory licensing claim that public interest matters 
of public health and welfare outweigh the exclusive rights of an IPRs 
owner.155  The idea of using compulsory licenses is most common with 
respect to providing readily available drugs in the developed world to 
developing countries; most notably for HIV drugs in Africa.156  However, 
proposals that suggest the use of compulsory licensing for technologies 
related to food security have been comparatively minimal.157 
Compulsory licensing is not free from criticism.  Because strong IPRs 
are necessary to drive innovation, an argument against compulsory licensing 
is that investment in potential inventions would be “less secure and less 
attractive” to the innovator.158  As director of the National Institutes of 
Health, Harold Varmus stated with respect to nonexclusive licenses in 
general, “[i]t is well documented that technologies with potential as 
therapeutics are rarely developed into products without some form of 
exclusivity, given the large development costs associated with bringing the 
product to the market.”159  Thus, at least with respect to the pharmaceutical 
industry, compulsory licenses should only be granted under exceptional 
circumstances. 
The loss of incentive to innovate specifically associated with 
compulsory licensing occurs mainly because such licenses encourage 
parallel importing.160  Parallel importing, otherwise known as the gray 
market, takes place when a product that is provided inexpensively to one 
country is sold to another country where a lucrative market exists, but 
without permission from the IPRs holder.161  With respect to 
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pharmaceuticals, it is argued that compulsory licensing schemes will 
actually decrease the access to life-saving drugs by reducing the innovative 
incentive to research and develop the original drug.162  This would result 
because the generic drug manufacturers would never have the opportunity to 
copy the original compound.163 
Various royalty arrangements have been proposed to deal with the 
issue of lost incentive resulting from forced licenses.164  Such schemes could 
create incentive by either providing an upfront fee to the IPRs holder that 
was forced to give up his or her rights, or provide payments as the 
commercial value is determined.165  Thus, it has been argued that reasonable 
royalties resulting from compulsory licensing would not significantly 
discourage the investment required to innovate.166  However, whether a 
royalty scheme is even appropriate for a compulsory license provided to a 
public sector entity for technologies leading to a product with low 
commercial value is questionable.167 
C. China Should Take Advantage of the Flexibility of TRIPS to Utilize 
Compulsory Licenses for Technologies Critical to Food Security 
China should utilize the emergency language168 of the compulsory 
licensing provisions of TRIPS to allow compulsory licensing of technologies 
critical for food security.169  In response to concerns that TRIPS might hinder 
efforts to control diseases of public health importance such as HIV, 
tuberculosis, and malaria, WTO members adopted a special Ministerial 
Declaration on November 14, 2001 at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Doha.170  The conference resulted in the further adoption of the Doha 
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Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha Declaration 
on TRIPS”),171 which reaffirmed flexibility for TRIPS member states in 
circumventing IPRs for sufficient access to essential medicine.172  This 
Declaration not only reaffirms the right to grant compulsory licenses and to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted, but allows each 
member state to determine what constitutes a “national emergency or other 
circumstance[] of extreme urgency . . . ”173 
In 2003, the WTO implemented a provision that permits WTO 
member states to make drugs for an overseas market if they receive notice 
from a country with inadequate manufacturing capacity of its own.174  As a 
result, China’s IP implemented the 2003 WTO decision through Order 37, an 
administrative order further interpreting Chinese Patent Law.175  China’s 
Order 37 substantiates the willingness of China to implement WTO 
declaratory provisions pertaining to compulsory licensing. 
TRIPS does not prohibit the use of compulsory licenses for 
technologies relevant to food security.  This is exemplified by the fact that 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS did not clarify the term “national 
emergency” as it relates to when such licenses may be granted.176  As a 
result, this flexibility in interpreting TRIPS will actually benefit China’s 
public sector.  China could, therefore, declare food shortages a national 
emergency, which would subsequently authorize the use of compulsory 
licenses for technologies required to create relevant GM crops.  For these 
reasons, China should issue an administrative order similar to Order 37 that 
would implement the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and interpret significant 
hunger or malnutrition as a national emergency to reserve the right to grant 
compulsory licenses for such purposes. 
Proposals to grant compulsory licenses to address issues of food 
security have only considered whether such licenses would be feasible if 
granted by the United States.177  More specifically, these arguments 
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discussed the ways in which the United States has failed to address how “the 
compulsory license provisions in Article 31 [of TRIPS] would apply to allow 
access to the tools of biotechnology for developing-country food security 
purposes.”178  This comment proposes, in broad terms, that developing 
countries that are WTO member states should utilize their ability to grant 
compulsory licenses if necessary to ensure food security.  In narrower terms, 
this comment argues that compulsory licenses for issues of food security 
would be most advantageous to China as a result of its already successful 
agricultural biotechnology industry.  Accordingly, China could use these 
measures to protect its interests in ensuring food security without violating 
its WTO obligations under TRIPS. 
D. China Should Not Refrain from Granting Compulsory Licenses Due to 
Concerns that Doing So Might Interfere with Innovation 
Compulsory licensing of IPRs for technologies critical to food 
security in China will not deter innovation.  The scenario in which 
compulsory licenses would be utilized in China will result after the 
introduction of a commercialized GM crop into the Chinese market by a 
foreign agricultural biotechnology company.  The foreign company will 
likely anticipate being granted some sort of IP protection under Chinese law 
for the essential enabling technologies used to create the GM crop. 
The demand for a compulsory license may occur in one of two ways if 
the Chinese public sector develops its own GM crop essential for food 
security.  First, the Chinese entity could autonomously develop a similar 
technology that falls within the scope of the protection provided to the 
private sector entity.  Conversely, the Chinese entity might simply recognize 
the technology as being necessary to develop a particularly vital GM crop 
and wish to adapt it to its own research and development.  In either scenario, 
a compulsory license may be granted to create the GM crop necessary for 
food security if China were to interpret significant hunger or malnutrition as 
a national emergency as permitted by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS.179 
Incentive to innovate on the side of the private sector company will 
not be compromised if the Chinese government grants compulsory licenses 
in the requisite scenario.  This results from the fact that the license will only 
be enforceable in China and will be used solely by China’s public sector for 
noncommercial purposes.  More importantly, issues of parallel importing 
with respect to GM crops will not be as significant as with pharmaceuticals.  
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With pharmaceuticals, concerns of compromised innovation occur when a 
patented product, the drug itself, experiences parallel importing.  In contrast, 
because the compulsory licenses that this comment suggests would only be 
granted by the Chinese government for selected enabling technologies, and 
not for the GM crop as a whole, parallel importing would be less of a 
concern. 
Even if parallel importation of GM crops does occur, most of the GM 
crops currently created by China’s public sector do not have significant 
commercial value.  As a result, the same technologies could still be used to 
create additional GM crops with high commercial value in the same country 
where the GM crops might be parallel imported to.  This would allow the 
IPRs owner to retain his or her investment interest.  This comment, 
therefore, suggests that with respect to agricultural biotechnology, concerns 
of lost innovation resulting from a gray market should be decoupled from 
similar concerns that are omnipresent within the pharmaceutical industry.  
Hence, granting compulsory licenses for noncommercial crops that will be 
utilized only in China would not be grounds for foreign companies to lose 
their incentive to innovate these technologies for additional markets that are 
more favorable to financial recovery. 
Notwithstanding the fact this comment argues that a compulsory 
licensing scheme geared towards ensuring food security will not 
compromise innovation, China should nonetheless be sensitive to how the 
private sector might perceive such licenses.  This results from the likelihood 
that the introduction of foreign technology could actually benefit China’s 
future efforts of ensuring food security, in spite of IPRs fragmentation.  One 
must only look at the promise of Golden Rice,180 despite the fact that the 
creation of most GM crops will not experience similar cooperation among 
the private sector.181  As a result, China should not hesitate to exercise its 
ability to grant compulsory licenses for fear that doing so might discourage 
any humanitarian effort provided for by the private sector, no matter how 
unlikely such effort might seem. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
GM crops have the potential to alleviate chronic malnutrition and 
hunger, to make more efficient use of farmland, and to further reduce soil 
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erosion and the use of pesticides.182  Agricultural biotechnology is not a 
panacea that will solve world hunger,183 but it is one promising way in which 
the problem can be addressed.184  As a result of continued population 
growth, global warming, and other environmental factors that are 
contributing to the challenges of food security,185 it may be argued that it is 
unethical not to recognize agricultural biotechnology’s potential with respect 
to the world’s hungry. 
China is likely to see an increase in the presence of agricultural 
biotechnology companies from abroad, possibly utilizing China’s stronger IP 
laws and enforcement as a way to protect their investments.  Because of the 
significant financial investment required to create a GM crop, agricultural 
biotechnology companies have been more hesitant to invest in China than 
have other industries.  In addition to strong IP protection, other factors such 
as protectionism and the difficulties associated with GM crop 
management,186 may determine whether the private sector will attempt to 
import their technologies into China.  All the same, the probability that the 
private sector will begin to seek protection under Chinese law of their 
enabling technologies used to create GM crops in the near future is 
becoming more likely. 
China must, therefore, prepare for the consequences that will arise as 
a result of the strengthening of its IP laws.  Because the broad language of 
TRIPS does not prohibit the declaration of a food shortage as a national 
emergency, China should not hesitate to grant compulsory licenses against 
foreign agricultural biotechnology companies.  Such licenses would not raise 
considerable concerns of parallel importing and, therefore, the incentive to 
innovate would not be defeated.  The result would provide for protection 
against the limitations on the availability of technologies critical for food 
security that may result from the recent strengthening of China’s IP laws and 
enforcement. 
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